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The UK Royal Navy’s new 
Queen Elizabeth class  
aircraft carriers will give the 
Navy force projection at sea 
and ashore. But according 
to a National Audit Ofﬁce 
report, there are limited 
suitably qualiﬁed and  
experienced personnel to 
operate the new carriers in 
time for development of the  
capability before 2020. 
By Pete Ito and Peter Antill 
S ince the ﬁrst operational aircraft carriers appeared during the First World War, they have 
become increasingly important to the 
major naval powers due to, ﬁrstly, their 
inherent ability to provide both offensive 
and defensive capabilities to a naval 
task force, and secondly, their ability to 
support amphibious operations and the 
projection of military power ashore. 
Once a country achieves such a 
capability, it is usually reluctant to lose 
it, with several countries either having 
brought new ships into service in recent 
years or, in the case of the UK and the 
US, having ongoing carrier replacement 
programmes. By analysing the most 
recent National Audit Ofﬁce (NAO) 
report, we will look at the UK’s efforts 
to update its carrier strike capability 
with the CVF/Queen Elizabeth class 
programme, along with the problems 
and issues still encountered, especially 
as they relate to ensuring the right 
quality and quantity of personnel.
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The aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth under 
construction at Rosyth Dockyard, Scotland 
(Crown Copyright 2014 Photographer-Andrew Linnett)
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The two aircraft carriers of the Queen 
Elizabeth class (HMS Queen Elizabeth 
and HMS Prince of Wales) are designed 
to replace the three Invincible class 
carriers, HMS Invincible, HMS Illustrious 
and HMS Ark Royal, commissioned in 
1980, 1982 and 1985 respectively. 
These in turn had replaced HMS Ark 
Royal and HMS Eagle, both heavily 
modiﬁed Audacious-class aircraft 
carriers. Both ships were originally built 
during the Second World War as a 
variant of the Implacable class under 
the names Irresistible and Audacious. 
The cancellation of the CVA-01 
programme in 1966 meant that these 
ships were the last conventional ﬁxed-
wing, catapult-equipped aircraft carriers 
operated by the Royal Navy, once they 
were themselves decommissioned in 
1972 and 1979 respectively.1
With the end of the Cold War, the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) deemed that 
there would soon be a requirement to 
replace the three Invincible class aircraft 
carriers, due to, ﬁrstly, the age of the 
ships. All three had been commissioned 
during the early 1980s and were starting 
to approach the end of their service 
lives, the expectation being that they 
would be decommissioned after 30 
years of service, between 2010 and 
2015. Secondly, they had been designed 
to conduct anti-submarine operations 
in the North Atlantic during a NATO-
Warsaw Pact confrontation—a defensive 
role trying to ensure the security of the 
sea lanes between North America and 
Europe. This was a very different role 
to the one that was increasingly likely in 
the post-Cold War security environment, 
and their relatively small size made them 
unsuitable to conduct power projection 
and rapid operational deployments 
around the world. 
PRIORITISING ASSETS 
The most recent of four reports2 by 
the NAO, entitled Delivering Carrier 
Strike, was published in March 2017.3 
The report highlights the importance 
of the new carriers to both the UK’s 
international standing and UK defence 
policy. Carrier Strike constitutes the 
initial phase of Carrier Enabled Power 
Projection (CEPP), consisting not only of 
the carriers, but F-35B Lightning II strike 
aircraft, helicopters (some equipped 
with the Crowsnest airborne radar 
system), unmanned aerial vehicles and 
amphibious forces. 
Such an ability to project military 
power will allow the UK to act militarily 
without having to rely on foreign 
basing rights, with the carriers being 
able to undertake a variety of missions 
and defence tasks. On 5 September 
2014, former UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron announced that the UK would 
bring both carriers into operational 
use.4 This was a major reversal of the 
plans under the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR) 2010, which 
planned to hold one of the carriers 
at extended readiness, due to the 
UK government’s priority of tackling 
the budget deﬁcit and the resulting 
pressure on the defence budget. With 
the retirement of the Sea Harriers in 
2010 and both HMS Ark Royal and HMS 
Illustrious being decommissioned, the 
Royal Navy would be without a carrier 
strike capability for a decade, a move 
that was criticised by the NAO.5
Just as the different combat (infantry, 
tanks), combat support (artillery, 
reconnaissance) and combat service 
support (engineers, logistics) elements 
of a ground force need to work together 
in a ‘combined-arms’ operation to 
achieve best effect, so aircraft carriers 
(and the aircraft they carry) need to 
Royal Navy Invincible class aicraft carrier HMS Ark Royal (Crown Copyright)
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operate as part of a ‘task group,’ 
meaning that other naval assets, such 
as frigates, destroyers, submarines 
and ﬂeet auxiliary ships, need to be 
deployed as well. Recent years have 
seen a reduction in the number of 
destroyers in the surface ﬂeet (only six 
Type 45s were built)6, the reduction in 
the number of frigates by four under 
SDSR 2010 (from 17 to 13 Type 23s)7 
and the nuclear hunter-killer (SSN) ﬂeet 
falling to seven vessels8 (currently four 
Trafalgar-class and three Astute-class). 
This means that a task group will 
“represent around 27% of the Navy’s 
ﬂeet by tonnage and 20% of the 
personnel needed to crew the ﬂeet, 
depending on how the carriers are 
deployed. Currently, the Navy carries 
out multiple operations concurrently 
using single ships. This means that 
it will need to change fundamentally 
how it operates and make judgements 
on priorities.”9 The MoD will therefore 
need to reﬁne its operational plans 
on deploying the carriers, so that the 
additional naval assets are available. 
The MoD commissioned work to 
develop a draft timetable looking at 
2017 to 2020 to help the frontline 
commands identify the equipment they 
would need to undertake trials and 
training programmes. However, “for 
most of the enablers (for example, 
battleﬁeld helicopters and logistics), the 
department will need to prioritise its 
resources to ensure they are available. 
Most are currently committed to other 
activities, but without them, the requisite 
trials and training for Carrier Strike 
cannot take place.”10 
What complicates this is that:11
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submarine warfare variant) are due to 
go out of service from 2023 onwards. 
The programme to replace them (the 
Type 26) is running late and it is unclear 
as to whether they will come into service 
in time to replace them.
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developed technical issues with the 
propulsion system and are undergoing 
a tightly scheduled major reﬁt 
programme. The MoD forecasts only 
a few will be available to support HMS 
Queen Elizabeth on her ﬁrst deployment, 
but even that is on the assumption there 
are no additional delays. 
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an anti-submarine capability and 
are in high demand. The Carrier 
Task Group will need them for both 
anti-submarine work and to host 
Crowsnest for airborne radar, but 
they cannot do both at the same 
time, meaning that the task group 
will require a signiﬁcant number 
of helicopters, which may not be 
available for the ﬁrst voyage.
  
 
 £6.2bn 
 
Approved cost of two new Queen  
Elizabeth class aircraft carriers
The Queen Elizabeth in Rosyth Dockyard Lightning II fast jet Merlin Mk2 helicopters (for hosting 
Crowsnest)
 
 
 £5.8bn 
 
Forecast cost of Lightning II 
procurement up to March 2021
 
 
 £0.3bn 
 
Cost of developing and buying the 
airborne radar system to protect the 
carriers (Crowsnest)
December 2020 When the Ministry of Defence expects to have an intial capability to operate the carriers,     
                            Lightning II and Crowsnest together (Carrier Strike) 
April 2026 When the MoD expects to have a fully ﬂexible carrier, allowing a range of roles (Carrier Enabled  
  Power Projection)
KEY FACTS 
Photo credit: MoD/Crown Copyright. Information taken from NAO report
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of 145,560. To minimise the impact 
of these gaps on Carrier Strike, the 
department is prioritising the capability 
and carrying out targeted recruitment. 
However, it will rely on a few people in 
certain roles to build up the skills and 
experience needed in time.”15
The NAO adds that particular “roles 
are affected, having a measurable, 
detrimental effect on operations and 
creating a risk that sufﬁciently qualiﬁed 
and experienced staff will not be in 
place in time for trials and development 
of the capability before 2020. The 
Navy has gaps in engineering and 
war-ﬁghting roles. The RAF has gaps 
in engineering, intelligence and some 
aircrew cadres.”16
The NAO goes on to stress that “there 
will be a lag between personnel being 
recruited and becoming sufﬁciently 
qualiﬁed and experienced for their new 
roles. New joiners to the Navy can take 
ﬁve to six years to become technicians. 
Training pilots to ﬂy the Lightning II jets 
requires eight to nine months of specialist 
training, in addition to four years of 
SHORTAGE OF SKILLED 
PERSONNEL 
The MoD now plans for the new 
carriers to provide “some capacity to 
support battleﬁeld helicopter operations. 
However, the necessary changes to 
the carriers to enable this are yet to be 
fully funded and will add further work 
to the CEPP schedule.”12 In addition, if 
both carriers are going to be operated 
with the UK achieving the full CEPP 
capability, then it ultimately comes 
down to having the correct quantity and 
quality of personnel so that both carriers 
can be crewed. Even though HMS 
Ocean underwent maintenance and 
reﬁt work between 2012 and 2014, it is 
still due to be retired in 2018, to release 
personnel to crew the second carrier.13 
While technology is vital, the NAO 
judges that “it is not possible to satisfy 
all demands” for the use of CEPP “with 
current levels of equipment, budget and 
personnel.”14 Speciﬁcally on personnel, 
the NAO notes that the MoD “…
has a shortage of military personnel, 
running at 4% below a target strength 
general fast-jet pilot training. The SDSR 
2015 decision to buy jets sooner has 
enabled more ﬂying hours, supporting 
the planned pipeline of training to deliver 
the required capability. More generally, 
the department will rely on a few people 
in certain roles to build up the skills and 
experience needed in time to operate 
the Carrier Strike capability, with limited 
resilience if staff decide to leave  
the services.”17
The NAO highlights that until the 
MoD has determined the maintenance 
and operational requirements of the 
new equipment “it will not know the 
total number of sufﬁciently qualiﬁed 
and experienced staff it needs to 
operate Carrier Strike.”18 However, the 
NAO analysis is that the MoD “faces 
challenges in delivering the capability 
with limited suitably qualiﬁed and 
experienced personnel to operate it.”19 
Indeed, it provides the comment that 
there is also “a need to take strategic 
decisions across defence that balance 
the resource, personnel and equipment 
demands of Carrier Strike with other 
defence capabilities.”20 It is worth noting 
the NAO comment that the MoD has 
devised a routine operating model and 
determined that “it is impossible to 
satisfy all demands for CEPP all the time, 
based on the current level of equipment, 
budget and personnel planned.”21
With respect to speciﬁc components 
of CEPP such as Crowsnest, the NAO 
determines that “the current schedule 
leaves limited time for integration 
training and work-up, which could 
mean that sufﬁcient numbers of 
Crowsnest-ﬁtted helicopters and trained 
crews are not ready to protect the 
carrier group when needed.”22 With 
regard to F-35B pilots, “the number of 
pilots will be just sufﬁcient up to 2026, 
with limited resilience if staff decide to 
leave the RAF.”23 
The issue of sufﬁcient numbers of 
skilled personnel extends to managing 
the commercial arrangements for 
UK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS QE CLASS COMPARISON
Length: 280 m
Total crew: 1,500
Range: 10,000 miles 
Displacement: 65,000t
Length: 210 m
Total crew: 1,050
Range: 7,000 miles 
Displacement: 22,000t
Length: 333 m
Total crew: 5,000
Range: Unlimited* 
Displacement: 87,997t 
    *Nuclear powered
Length: 262 m
Total crew: 1,950
Range: Unlimited* 
Displacement: 42,000t 
    *Nuclear powered
UK: HMS Queen Elizabeth
UK: HMS Invincible (predecessor)
US: Nimitz class
France: Charles de Gaulle
56m
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support. The NAO points out that 
“ensuring there is sufﬁcient commercial 
capacity to do this will be challenging, 
as there are long-standing skills gaps in 
the department’s contract management 
teams.”24 The NAO stresses that the 
MoD ”… has assessed that its contract 
management teams are under-staffed 
and is prioritising higher-risk commercial 
areas. Defence Equipment and Support 
has long-standing skills gaps, as 
highlighted in our 2015 report. It has 
failed to recruit and retain enough 
skilled staff and is undergoing a new 
change programme to re-prioritise its 
commercial skills. With such complex 
commercial arrangements to negotiate 
for supporting Carrier Strike, there is a 
risk that not all contracts will be in place 
on time. A lack of commercial staff has 
delayed the purchase of spares for HMS 
Queen Elizabeth before its ﬁrst sailing.”25 
Ultimately, the NAO in its list 
of recommendations, under the 
admonition to “build more resilience 
into its workforce model” notes that “in 
the longer term, the department needs 
to maintain efforts to recruit and train 
extra personnel.”26 
THE US NAVY
To underline the NAO’s emphasis 
on the importance of having enough 
suitably qualiﬁed personnel in order 
to generate capability, it is worth 
noting that a recent US Government 
Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) report on 
the US Navy’s force structure, with a 
speciﬁc focus on the Navy’s attempt 
at "optimal manning" to reduce crew 
sizes during the period 2003–2012, did 
exactly the same.27 The GAO notes that 
unless “it identiﬁes the personnel needs 
and costs associated with a larger ﬂeet 
size, the Navy runs the risk of buying 
ships that it cannot fully man, potentially 
repeating the mistakes associated 
with the optimal manning period and 
resulting in degraded surface ﬂeet 
readiness and increased maintenance 
costs.”28 The report ﬁnds that the “Navy 
will likely face manning challenges, 
especially given its current difﬁculty in 
ﬁlling authorised positions, as it seeks to 
increase the size of its ﬂeet as much as 
30% over its current size.”29
The GAO stresses that even “with the 
reduced personnel authorised since 
optimal manning, the Navy has had 
difﬁculty ﬁlling authorised personnel 
slots,” adding that the “commands 
responsible for manning, equipping, 
and training the surface ﬂeet have 
cited the lack of personnel available 
to be distributed to ships as their 
primary challenge.”30 Indeed, the GAO 
comments that ofﬁcials “said that it is 
not uncommon for billets to remain 
unﬁlled for six months or more and 
that shore commands are more likely 
to experience such ‘gapped billets’ for 
even longer periods.”31 
Referencing other studies, the GAO 
cites a 2014 Naval Audit Service 
report on critical gapped billets, which 
found that “unless the Navy increases 
enlisted personnel, recurring gaps 
will not be corrected.”32 In addition, 
the GAO highlights a Congressional 
Research Service estimate that about 
“15,000 additional sailors and aviation 
personnel might be needed to man the 
47 additional ships above the previous 
308-ship plan.”33 
Finally, it is important to refer to 
a widely-held assumption that more 
cutting-edge technology means fewer 
people are needed. The GAO refutes 
that idea, noting that “the Navy 
developed estimates of manpower 
requirements and crew size targets for 
its new ships based on assumptions 
that technologies would enable smaller 
crews. However, crew sizes on most new 
HMS Queen Elizabeth under construction (Crown Copyright 2014- Photographer-Andrew Linnett)
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The Ministry of Defence will deploy the carrier alongside other ships and military equipment, collectively referred to as a Carrier Task Group
Notes 
1. The make-up of this group is likely to vary with time and depending on why the group is being deployed.
2. Maritime intra-theatre lift is the ability to move people and goods within the task group. The MoD is deciding   
 how it will meet this requirement. 
 
Source: National Audit Ofﬁce analysis of departmental data
ILLUSTRATIVE CARRIER TASK GROUP 
Maritime intra-theatre lift solution 
(not yet identiﬁed)
Attack submarine
Merlin helicopters (for anti-
submarine protection)
Supply ships (solid support/tankers)
Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carrier
Lightning II jets (with or without US jets)
Crowsnest (Merlin Mk2 helicopters)
Type 45 destroyers
Wildcat helicopters
Type 23 frigates
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ship classes have grown over time as 
anticipated workload reductions from 
new technologies have not materialised 
and the Navy gains more experience 
operating the new ships.”34 
The GAO cites the example of the 
Littoral Combat Ship programme, 
which was originally designed and 
built to accommodate a total crew size 
of 75, but has since been redesigned 
to accommodate 98 sailors, a 31% 
increase.35
The NAO and GAO reports highlight 
a critical point: While naval forces 
everywhere will be looking to use the best 
possible technology, it remains essential 
to focus on properly manning the 
equipment. Defence acquisition planning 
should ensure that the best laid plans for 
the best naval forces are guaranteed to 
have the required quantity and quality of 
skilled personnel to go to sea. ??
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